Dynamic capability and superior firm performance in the UK Media Industry by Oliver, John James
1 | P a g e  
 
MANUSCRIPT 
 
Title:  Dynamic capability and superior firm performance in the UK Media 
Industry  
 
Abstract 
The past decade has seen a transformation in the way television broadcasters have 
managed their businesses. This paper examines the theory of ‘dynamic capability’ in 
two UK television broadcasters, BskyB and ITV, and their ability to adapt and 
transform themselves into multi-product, multi-platform media companies. Using 
Comparative Financial Analysis and Content Analysis of company Annual Reports, it 
compares and contrasts operating ratios in a time series, to gauge each company’s 
historical performance over time, whilst also providing inter-company comparisons. It 
also illustrates how the strategic management of media firms can be significantly 
different for two companies operating in the same sector.  
 
This research demonstrates an original contribution to knowledge in two areas. 
Firstly, it provides evidence of the dynamic capability performance effects of 
significant players in UK television broadcasting. Secondly, it extends the limited 
debate in literature on how to measure dynamic capability performance.         
 
Key words: Dynamic Capability, Organizational Adaptation, Television Broadcaster, 
Media Management, Corporate Performance, Comparative Financial Analysis.    
 
 
Introduction 
The emergence of the new media environment has paved the way for new 
technologies, digitalisation, the proliferation of television channels, time shifted 
viewing habits and multiple platforms to consume television content. Albertazzi and 
Cobley (2010:179) noted that the “transformational changes” in this new competitive 
environment may have felt like an unwelcomed revolution to some television 
broadcasters, whilst to others, it is likely to have provided them with a unique 
sequence of evolutionary opportunities. This transformational context raises a number 
of questions for business and management researchers. Firstly, how have television 
broadcasters managed their businesses and responded to the challenges presented in a 
new media environment characterised by change and uncertainty? Secondly, how 
have they managed and adapted their resources and capabilities to remain 
competitive?   
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This paper examines the theory of ‘dynamic capability’ in UK television broadcasters 
and their adaptation to a competitive landscape heavily influenced by new media 
technologies. Colapinto (2010:60) set the tone for this discussion arguing that 
traditional media companies have been required to “adopt dynamic responses to the 
challenges of a multi-platform television market”. As such, the concept of dynamic 
capability is ideally placed to investigate the strategic management practices of media 
firms. This theory has generated a range of definitions, interpretations and strands of 
inquiry in literature, making for an eclectic mix of knowledge, and bearing this in 
mind, this paper has opted to focus on four fundamental principles. Firstly, that 
dynamic capability is concerned with change. Secondly, that this change process is 
centred on a firm’s ability adapt and renew their resources, capabilities and 
competencies. Thirdly, that this process requires deliberate resource investment in 
new organisational learning and processes that aim to produce positive effects on 
corporate performance and competitive advantage over time. Fourthly, that this 
process of adaptation occurs in a compressed timescale due to the fast changing 
nature of market conditions. 
 
In particular, this research sought to explore the question of why some organisations 
are better at managing their resources to produce superior performance than others. 
To illustrate this aspect of strategic management, this research compared and 
contrasted the dynamic capabilities of two UK broadcasters, BskyB and ITV, their 
adaptation in response to the new media environment, and how this has lead to 
differing corporate financial performance.  
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Theoretical Framing 
A review of literature on dynamic capability reveals a relatively nascent theory. As a 
concept that has been informed by the Resource-based and Knowledge-based 
paradigms of strategic management, this emerging idea presents an array of 
definitions, interpretations, and even claims and counter claims of its very existence. 
As a consequence, the notion of ‘dynamic capability’ appears to raise many more 
questions in literature than there are answers.  
 
The idea that television broadcasters may or may not have a dynamic capability arose 
from theorists questioning how firms sustain competitive advantage and superior 
performance in such high velocity conditions (Oliver, 2012) where “the increasing 
dynamism of the environment” (Pettigrew, Thomas and Whittington, 2007:143) 
makes it increasingly  difficult to remain competitive. Many scholars (Mintzberg, 
1987; Senge, 1990; Leavy, 1998; Zollo and Winter, 2002) concluded that superior 
performance is driven by a firm’s ability to learn, adapt and change their resource 
configuration in order to produce a series of temporary competitive advantages. 
Lawton and Rajwani (2011:167) took this line of thinking further and concluded that 
“dynamic capabilities are the bridge between firm resources and business context” 
and as such, this concept provided a useful lens through which to examine superior 
organisational performance.  
 
The central tenet of ‘dynamic capability’ is a consideration of the renewal of firm 
resources and capabilities. It suggests that tangible resources are configured and 
utilised to generate value and rents, and that intangible resources in the form of skills, 
experience, learning, systems and processes create competitive advantages that cannot 
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easily be imitated by competitors. Ambrosini and Bowman (2009:30-35) argued that 
dynamic capabilities “specifically focuses on how firms can change their valuable 
resources over time”. They go on to argue that the words dynamic capability refer to 
the drive and enthusiasm of a firm in their “renewal of resources”. This perspective 
echoes the earlier work of Teece and Pisano (1994) and Zollo and Winter (2002) who 
emphasised that a changing external environment required firms to adapt and 
reconfigure resources, assets, operating routines and competencies in order to improve 
its effectiveness and competitiveness in the pursuit of superior performance.  In a 
sense, the idea that firm capabilities need to be dynamic is a consideration of the 
competitive environment, its future direction, and how a firm can take advantage of 
the opportunities provided in their existing and future markets.  
 
The theoretical frame for this research identifies and differentiates the concept of 
dynamic capability by considering the discrete, but inter-related definitions of 
‘capability’, ‘core competence’ and ‘dynamic capability’.  Whilst Ljungquist 
(2007:394) noted that these terms are often amalgamated in literature, there is more 
value in understanding each concept and “distinguish(ing) them by their 
characteristics”.   
 
Although many organisations have access to similar resources, it is their ability to 
manage, as Grant (1991:119) suggests, “a team of resources to perform some task or 
activity” better than competitive rivals and extend the resource potential that 
differentiates one organisations capability and performance over another. Winter 
(2003:991-993) developed this argument suggesting that capabilities had a hierarchy. 
Starting with ‘zero level capabilities’ he suggested that this low level capability 
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described the ability of an organisation to “earn its living by producing and selling the 
same product on the same scale, and to the same customer population, over time”.  He 
went on to point out that dynamic capability governs the rate of change in zero level 
capabilities, and that they have a faster rate of change, and therefore, are different to 
zero level capabilities.  
 
In their review of strategic management literature, Pettigrew et al (2007:39) noted that 
the idea of firm ‘capability’ should also be extended to a consideration of competition 
in the market place, and therefore, comparisons of long term superior performance. 
As such, firm capabilities can be considered as a minimum threshold of resources that 
are required to satisfy market requirements. They proposed four fundamental 
principles of capability-based competition between firms;   
 
• Corporate strategy should be built on business processes, not products and 
markets. 
• Competitive success depends on transforming a company’s key processes into 
strategic capabilities that consistently provide superior value to customers.  
• Companies create these capabilities by making strategic investments in a 
support infrastructure that links together and transcends traditional SBUs and 
functions. 
• A capabilities based strategy is championed by the CEO. 
 
Bitar and Hasfi (2007) support this overarching view and suggested that capabilities 
arise from a range of organisational elements including the interaction of people, 
structure, systems and values. It is this conceptualisation of organisational capability 
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providing a means of competitive advantage that gives rise to the notion of unique and 
distinctive business processes that provide customer value, thus extending the debate 
into the realm of core competence.   
 
A generation of researchers have been exposed to, investigated and developed the  
conceptual thinking of Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990:82) idea that core competencies 
are “the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse 
production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies”. We know that core 
competencies provide sustainable competitive advantage through their unique ability 
to provide customer value. However, we must acknowledge that all competitive 
environments change over time, this raises the question of whether or not 
organisational capabilities and competencies can remain relevant to a new competitive 
landscape? Whilst investment in, and development of, resources and core 
competencies provide an opportunity for embedded operational routines and learning 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992) in high velocity environments this type of routine behaviour 
can also present a dilemma for organisations. On the one hand, they have to invest in 
and exploit their existing capabilities and competencies, whilst at the same time, they 
need to be mindful of the necessity to refresh and adapt their resource base in line 
with strategic environmental changes. Otherwise, these existing competencies could 
become core rigidities and barriers to change.  In contrast, Danneels (2002:1097) 
provided a more encouraging perspective on embedded operational routines, arguing 
that rather than restricting the firm, existing core competencies could be successfully 
used to “leverage” new competencies.   
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Explaining superior organisational performance through the lens of dynamic 
capability originated in the work of Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997:516) who argued 
that firms needed to renew competencies in line with changing competitive conditions 
and that it was “the firms ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external competencies to address changing environments” that explained variations in 
inter-firm performance.  
 
The differences in the definitions of capability, core competency and dynamic 
capability may at first glance look like a small matter of semantics. However, closer 
scrutiny draws the eye to two words that suggest that dynamic capability can be 
differentiated from core competence and capability. The words “reconfigure” and 
“changing environments” in the Teece et al (1997) definition suggests that core 
competencies, whilst providing unique customer benefits, may in fact decay or 
become irrelevant due to structural changes in the competitive environment. As a 
consequence, they would not provide a means of sustaining competitive advantage as 
they decay through lack of market relevance and subsequent organisational dis-
investment. This line of thinking has subsequently been supported by a number of 
scholars including Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) and Ambrosini and Bowman (2009). 
 
Another focal point in literature is concerned with the idea of whether or not it is 
possible for organisations to reconfigure their resource base without having a dynamic 
capability.  Winter (2003:992-3) answered this issue by arguing that organisational 
change can occur outside the realm of dynamic capability where unusual 
environmental challenges in the form of “force majeure” act as a driver for change. 
What differentiates these acts from dynamic capability is that the latter require “long 
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term commitments to specialized resources” which incur higher investment costs for 
the organization which adapts to, and benefits from, opportunities presented by new 
competitive conditions. This point is illustrated in the account of how the Wall Street 
Journal, built dynamic capabilities for the online provision of journalism content. 
Steinbock (2000:184) noted that building these new capabilities required, “bold 
resource commitments” and “innovative responses in times of market turmoil and 
technological change”. 
 
Adapting firm capabilities to create dynamic capability 
The bibliographic and co-citation analysis of dynamic capability research by Di 
Stefano, Peteraf and Verona (2010) presented several significant areas of inquiry by 
researchers over the past decade. Firstly, researchers have tended to focus their 
activities on strategic organisational change, adaptation and the transformational 
processes that deliver these changes. Secondly, the creation of dynamic firm 
capabilities requires a long term commitment to resource renewal that bears higher 
costs over a sustained period of time. Thirdly, that there are certain factors that enable 
or inhibit the development of dynamic capability, organisational renewal and 
adaptation.  
 
The factors that enable the development of a dynamic capability has been presented 
by numerous authors (Colapinto, 2010; Macher and Mowery, 2009; Winter, 2003; 
Danneels, 2002; Steinbock, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat, 2000; Karim 
and Mitchell, 2000) who have argued that this reconfiguration and refreshing of a 
firm’s resource base can be achieved by four tangible resourced based approaches;  
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• investment in new organisational processes and routines;  
• product innovation and development;  
• forming strategic alliances;  
• corporate acquisitions and mergers.  
 
In addition, Winter (2003) argued that intangible firm resources in the shape of 
managerial cognition and aspiration levels created a context for these tangible 
resources commitments to be evaluated and ultimately acted upon. Tripsas and 
Gavetti (2000) illustrated this idea by suggesting that whilst a firm could invest in 
new organisational processes and routine, and research and development to 
successfully innovate new products, management could indeed fail to capitalise on 
this resource investment when competing in the market place. 
 
Measuring dynamic capability  
Interestingly, the review of dynamic capability literature undertaken by Di Stefano et 
al (2010) showed that strategic change, organisational adaptation, and 
transformational processes have been significant areas of inquiry by researchers for 
more than a decade. Yet the notion of measuring a firm’s dynamic capability, their 
impact and ability to deliver superior firm performance has largely been ignored. As 
Lawton and Rajwani (2010:167) pointed out, researchers may have avoided this issue 
given that there is “difficulty in establishing causality with performance”. The few 
studies that did seek to provide a measure of superior firm performance derived from 
new and dynamic firm capabilities included: Macher and Mowery (2009:41) whose 
empirical research of semi-conductor manufacturing found defect rates could be 
reduced following the introduction of new technological processes, research and 
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development, organisation and IT practices. They argued that building these new 
dynamic capabilities provided evidence of “firm-specific performance differences” in 
the sample by way of a firm’s capability in managing novelty; Miller and Shamise’s 
(1996) longitudinal study of major U.S. film studios measured dynamic capability by 
using a number of performance indicators including return on sales, market share, 
profits and even the number of Academy Awards won; and Ahuja and Katilia’s 
(2004) work measured dynamic capability in the form of innovative practices in US 
chemical firms that resulted in patent applications.     
 
Methodology 
 
A Mixed Method Approach 
This research used a multi-method approach. Fielding and Fielding (1986); Guba and 
Lincoln (1989) and Saunders et al (2000) considered this approach beneficial as it can 
improve the credibility and trustworthiness of findings. Kirk and Miller (1986:15) also 
considered the multi-method as a complimentary technique since the qualitative 
methodology “identifies the presence or absence of something”, whereas the quantitative 
methodology “involves the degree to which something is present”. 
Quantitative Method: Comparative Financial Analysis  
Corporate financial operating ratios provided a practice-led method to assess and 
measure the dynamic capability of BskyB and ITV. Firstly, by comparing corporate 
performance longitudinally in the form of time series to see how capabilities evolved 
over time (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000) and secondly, by using cross sectional 
analysis, this performance could then be benchmarked against both companies in the 
sample. Kung (2008:90) rightly argued that the dynamic media environment “makes it 
hard to undertake longitudinal studies...since boundaries and definitions shift so 
frequently” and it is with this in mind that a rigorous and systematic approach to the 
data collection was used.  
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Ellis and Williams (1993:203) provided a useful framework to operationalise the 
research. They argued that Comparative Financial Analysis focuses on “an individual 
company, using both horizontal and vertical analysis, which facilitates the 
measurement of how an organization is performing when compared with its past 
achievements” and whether “this improvement (is) at the same rate as it’s rivals”. 
However, they also warned that when these inter-firm comparisons are attempted, 
researchers should ensure that companies in the sample should ensure that there is 
rigour in data compatibility and business context otherwise false comparisons will be 
made. As such, they suggested a four step approach to justify the comparison of one 
UK television broadcaster against another. 
 
 
Step 1 – Identify the companies core activities. 
The aim of this research was to present analysis on the dynamic capabilities of two 
UK commercial television broadcasters. Yet, when considered over time, a company 
operating in one sector a decade ago, could conceivably end up in multiple sectors, 
and therefore, a wider industry definition ten years later. As such, this research 
focused on two companies whose primary revenue source has been derived from 
television broadcasting between 2000-2011. The reason being that television 
broadcasters, as traditional media, were a key target for adaptation and “migration” 
(Aris and Bughin 2009:262) to the new media environment as they had invested in 
new media technologies, distribution platform, markets. They do, therefore, provide a 
good insight into the notion of dynamic capability.  
 
Step 2 – Compare competitors core activity 
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Both BskyB and ITV derive the majority of their corporate revenues from television 
broadcasting and can, therefore, be considered as direct competitors operating in the 
same industry.   
 
Step 3- Do competitors pass the test of compatibility? 
Ellis and Williams (1993) considered compatibility in terms of the accounting 
framework used by competitors, which in this case is broadly similar. However, 
perhaps a criticism for this research is that the two companies are not compatible as 
they have different business models, one subscription based television broadcasting, 
the other, advertiser funded television broadcasting. Also, as ITV only came into 
existence in 2004, so there are four years (2000-03) were there is no comparative data.   
   
Step 4- Do competitors pass the test of business context?   
This requirement ensures that companies predominantly operate in similar product 
markets, that is, within UK television broadcasting. Again both BskyB and ITV 
satisfy this requirement.   Ellis and Williams (1993:208) readily acknowledge that 
“this approach to inter-firm comparisons is undoubtedly judgemental” but argue that 
it is none the less an attempt to make the selection of companies in sample frame as 
rigorous as possible.   
 
Units of Analysis 
Bitar and Hafsi (2007:404) argued that capability and performance analysis was like a 
“black box” of speculation and yet there has been research that has linked and 
measured capabilities and firm performance. These included: Miller and Shamise 
(1996) use financial ratios, revenues, profits and Academy Awards for US film 
studios; Ahuja and Katilia’s (2004) work on the patenting activities of global  US 
based chemical firms; and Macher and Mowery’s (2009) investigation into the 
introduction of new process technologies in semi-conductor manufacturing. This 
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research, however, measured superior performance in terms of financial operating 
ratios in the form of; 
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) as an overall measure of corporate 
performance as it reflects the assets used by the company to generate profit. ROCE is 
used to measure the return on an organisation’s total assets. For example, a business 
which has a lot of assets, but little in the way of profit will have a smaller ROCE. By 
comparison, a company with the same level of assets that produced a higher profit 
will have a higher ROCE. One criticism of this measure is that corporate assets are 
liable to depreciation, so as they devalue, the ROCE will rise even though operating 
profits may remain at the same level. One further problem with this ratio is that it can 
be defined in many ways. For example, the phrase  'capital employed' can be a 
calculation of: fixed assets plus current assets, less current liabilities; or, share capital 
plus reserves, plus borrowing which may include lease obligations, bank loans, 
overdraft, interest, provisions, associates and investments. This research employed the 
use of the term capital employed as being total assets (fixed and current) as it was felt 
to be a more appropriate measure of firm assets. 
ROCE was therefore calculated as: Operating Profit/Total Assets X 100 
Net Profit margin (NPM) which measures the percentage profit of each £ of 
turnover after direct and indirect expenses have been deducted. Inter-firm 
comparisons of this ratio are likely to reveal a number of strategic management issues 
like: the way they compete in the market place; their pricing strategy, and their ability 
to manage costs.  
 
Net Profit Margin was calculated as: Operating Profit/Turnover x 100 
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Asset Turnover (AT) is a measure of how efficiently a business uses their assets to 
generate sales revenue. A high AT figure indicates that the firm is generating a high 
level of sales from its resource base, although a note of caution should be made. High 
AT figures can also be an indicator of ‘overtrading’ where sales volumes are too high 
to be sustained from an existing resource base. Equally, a low AT figure is a good 
indication that the company may not be reaching the level of sales that it should be 
from its resource base.  
 
The Asset Turnover ratio was calculated as: Turnover/Total Assets  
 
Qualitative Method: Content Analysis 
This research followed the example of Miller and Shamise (1996) who used company 
Annual Reports, including the statements made by the respective Chairmen and Chief 
Executive Officers. These were used in order to understand and assess how these 
organisations had adapted to new competitive conditions. Helfat (2000:958) argued 
that the identification of dynamic capabilities in fast moving markets, like the media, 
could be difficult to identify as they tended to be “less structured and less complex”.  
 
In terms of this research, the review of literature provided a list of sampling units for 
selective inclusion in the content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004:99). These included; 
 
• Aspirational statements made by the Chairman/CEO. Winter (2003)  
• Managerial Cognition (right or wrong decisions).  Tripsas and Gavetti 
(2000) 
• R&D costs (real cost and cost as a % of total costs). Helfat and 
Raubitschek (2000); Steinbock (2000); Macher and Mowery (2009) 
15 | P a g e  
 
• An indication of product development. Helfat and Raubitschek (2000); 
Steinbock (2000);Winter (2003); Danneels (2002); Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000)  
• Significant Investment in people, and or, processes Zollo and Winter 
(2002); Winter (2003) 
• Acquisition of other companies for their capabilities Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000);Winter (2003); Karim and Mitchell (date); Colapinto 
(2010) 
 
Data Analysis 
The content analysis of each company’s Annual Report and Accounts revealed a 
number of interesting management issues, using the variables previously listed.  
 
Aspirational statements made by the Chairman/CEO  
By their very nature, corporate Annual Accounts tend to act as a vehicle to for a 
positive interpretation of firm performance in trading conditions. 
 
At the start of the new millennium, BskyB Chairman Rupert Murdoch set an 
aspirational tone for the company as it entered the dawn of the new media 
environment. He said that the company were; 
 
 
“changing the way people watch TV and the way we communicate, empowering 
consumers with tomorrow’s technology today” and that they will “anticipate what 
consumers want and how they want to access it” 
Rupert Murdoch, Chairman, BskyB  (2000:1) 
 
With a record breaking 21% increase in subscribers to 3.6 million in 2000, BskyB 
were not content to rest on their success and continued to set ambitious subscriber 
figures of 7m by 2003 and in 2004 set a target of 10m subscribers by 2010. Their 
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ambition of “sky in every home” (Murdoch, R, 2003:1) would seem to be an 
aspiration too far. However, they continued to achieve their subscriber targets ahead 
of schedule and argued in 2005 that the pay-tv sector penetration in the UK and 
Ireland was only 44% and in the “long term penetration levels can increase to around 
80%” (Murdoch, J, 2005:3). 
 
The statements made by three successive BskyB Chief Executive Officers for more 
than a decade are testament to a risk taking corporate culture that sees opportunity in 
the seismic challenges presented by the new media environment. The words, risk 
taking, opportunity, adaptable and invest act like beacons of confidence in successive 
annual reports. These aspirations are illustrated in the following statements; 
 
“Sky therefore seeks to invest and adapt in order to remain competitive.” 
Rupert Murdoch, CEO, BskyB (2003:3) 
 
“This has been a year of significant changes- not just for Sky, but for the entire 
industry. Throughout the year, our focus has been on setting the pace of change, and 
re-affirming our appetite for doing so.” 
James Murdoch, CEO, BskyB (2006:4) 
 
“We challenge ourselves constantly to be a business that is adaptable and embraces 
change.” 
Jeremy Darroch, CEO, BskyB (2008:4) 
 
The various leaders of ITV on the other hand, have tended to provide statements that 
are more pragmatic an insular rather than being aspirational. Following the merger of 
Carlton and Granada to create ITV in 2004, the Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer statements tended to focus on two areas; making the business more efficient 
and developing new revenue streams for the company; 
 
“Our actions have been based on achieving a number of the goals...these included 
increasing efficiency, reducing regulatory costs and placing news at the centre of 
ITV’s public service programming”. 
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Sir Peter Burt, Chairman, ITV (2004:1) 
 
“We have continued with our programme of developing our business and changing 
our operations to enable us to take advantage of the rapidly evolving digital television 
world. In early 2006 we re-branded our operations, from a fresh new look onscreen 
for our channels through to new signage and logo for our ITV production business”. 
Charles Allen, CEO, ITV (2005:19) 
 
The introduction of Michael Grade as Executive Chairman in 2006 did not change the 
tone of these less than aspirational statements. He greeted stakeholders not with a 
rallying call to action, but; 
 
“Having been in post for two months it is too soon to conclude 
definitive plans for the business, but generally I have developed 
more positive impressions than negative ones, and the latter are 
mostly within our control to remedy”. 
 
Michael Grade, Executive Chairman, ITV (2006:1) 
 
In 2009 and 2010 ITV were still looking for a glimmer of light in their Turnaround 
Strategy. Their reports and accounts for these years were entitled “Platform for 
change” and “Transforming ITV” and introduced another new management team. 
The new Chairman and Chief Executive Officer were placed at the helm of a 
company to find a new strategic direction in a media landscape characterised by 
change. Once again, the statements tended to be cautious and low key; 
 
“There is a shared recognition that the business will need to change substantially 
going forward if we are to return to sustained growth.” 
Archie Norman, Chairman, ITV (2009:3) 
 
“We require clarity of vision and a clear road map for change. Transformation 
requires a sense of ‘time and place’ because it is vital that everyone at ITV knows 
what is required of them and where we are in the journey”. 
Archie Norman, Chairman, ITV (2010:2) 
 
Managerial Cognition  
Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) and Winter (2003) argued that the cognitive ability of 
managers to seek out, take advantage and capitalise on market opportunities can be 
regarded as an intangible resource that could deliver superior firm performance.  
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Over the decade, the management of BskyB had made various strategic decisions that 
in the main appeared to be successful. These included formulating strategy and 
navigating an uncertain media environment, making resource investment decisions, 
developing new products and making corporate acquisitions and divestments. These 
variables will be explored in more detail later, but how the management of BskyB and 
ITV have viewed the competitive environment is interesting. On the one hand BskyB 
have invested heavily in new capabilities, made corporate acquisitions and have been 
robust their views on the accrued losses of £55m in British Interactive Broadcasting 
Limited and £11m in KirchPay TV in 2000. This corporate optimism is also reflected 
in their statement on the global economic crisis of 2008; 
 
“In a dynamic market place, it is the work of the business to continue to adapt and 
refresh itself...over the years Sky has reintroduced itself, reinvented itself and 
revitalised its appeal.” 
Rupert Murdoch, CEO, BskyB (2005:1) 
 
“These changes are creating significant opportunities for companies that have the 
capability and appetite to adapt their businesses.” 
James Murdoch, CEO, BskyB (2008:2) 
 
In 2007, ITV stated that their Turnaround Strategy would involve making the 
transition to digital media markets. This strategy, however, appeared inconsistent on 
two counts. Firstly, their new corporate vision did not include any reference to a new 
media world; 
 
“Our vision is for ITV to be the UK’s favourite source of free entertainment.” 
Michael Grade, Executive Chairman, ITV (2007:2) 
 
Secondly, the wholesale recruitment of a new executive management team included a 
wealth of accumulated experience in television broadcasting, marketing and 
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production. Yet, these appointments, on the face of it, there appeared to be an obvious 
error as this new team did not include executives with new media experience;   
“The ITV Senior Executive team was considerably strengthened in 2007. In Global 
Content, we recruited Dawn Airey, latterly of Sky and five. Rupert Howell, a major 
figure from the advertising sector, joined us in the crucial post of Managing Director 
of ITV Brand and Commercial. Carolyn Fairbairn, formerly of the BBC and 
McKinsey, leads our strategy and development function. Entering 2008, we have 
confirmed that Peter Fincham, the controller of BBC1 until October 2007, will join 
ITV as Director of Television”. 
Michael Grade, Executive Chairman, ITV (2007:2) 
 
A decade after the advent of the new media environment, ITV acknowledge that they 
had not acted quickly enough to address the challenges, threats and opportunities 
presented by a changing market place. This lack of managerial cognition was 
acknowledged by the new CEO in his 2010 statement to shareholders; 
 
“Adapting to this new media environment requires urgent change to ITV’s strategy, 
management, culture and organisation. We have started to address the challenges 
we face but there are no quick fixes”. 
Adam Crozier, Chief Executive, ITV(2010:5) 
 
In an attempt to address these challenges, and previous under performance, ITV stated 
that; 
 
“About half of our leadership group has changed”  
Archie Norman, Chairman, ITV (2011:2) 
 
An indication of product development 
Many researchers including Helfat and Raubitschek (2000), Winter (2003), Danneels 
(2002) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) have argued product develop is an important 
characteristic of dynamic capability and that for this to be successful, “bold resource 
commitments” (Steinbock, 2000:184) needed to be committed over the long term. 
 
Again, we see contrasting fortunes in both broadcasters. BskyB have transformed 
themselves from being one of the UKs leading television broadcasters into a multi-
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platform, multi-product entertainment and communications business that has been 
described as resulting in; 
 
“...a step change in our capabilities...” 
Jeremy Darroch, CEO, BskyB (2007:3) 
 
In a decade BskyB have innovated numerous products including: Sky Active services 
incorporating shopping and betting on certain broadcast channels, interactive features 
on Sky Sports and Sky News, distribution of news and sports content on the Orange 
mobile phone network (2000); the UKs first personal television recorder in Sky+, the 
Sky Guide advanced electronic programme guide (2001); Sky Multiroom 
subscription, and an enhanced version of Sky+ (2004); Sky Gnome the portable 
device to listen to audio content (2005); Sky HDTV, Sky Broadband and Sky Talk, 
Sky+ access from customer mobile phones (2006); Sky Anytime an on-demand 
service (2007); Sky 3D television (2010) and Sky Go (2011).  
 
ITV on the otherhand, has been led by a Content Strategy and has regarded innovation 
and new products and services as being programme and scheduling based. Again, this 
approach looks limited, insular and inhibiting as far as dynamic capability is 
concerned. As a content led company, one of the challenges they face relates to the 
path dependency argument of Jarzabkowski (2004) in so far as the recursive nature of 
ITV’s aim to invest in “established and returnable drama and entertainment series 
that can be sold internationally” means that they are less likely to invest in innovative 
programming. They acknowledged this argument in 2006, stating; 
 
“There is a lack of innovation in our programming, partly resulting from a fear of 
ratings”. 
Michael Grade, Executive Chairman, ITV (2006:1) 
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This is further backed up by their 2007 statement where they regarded the launch of 
their new ITV1 schedule as a “commitment to innovation”.  
 
There is no doubt that ITV have invested billions of pounds in programming from in-
house, external and independent producers, as well as in content acquired from US 
distributors.  But how much of this investment in programming can be regarded as 
new and innovative? In 2010 Adam Crozier was critical of the company’s lack of an 
innovative edge and stated in his report to shareholders that; 
 
“ITV Studios’ creative content pipeline had depleted over time with no major new 
entertainment programme format created since 2006”. 
Adam Crozier, Chief Executive, ITV (2010:5) 
 
However, by 2010, ITV had started to adapt to the new media environment and 
launched a number of new initiatives including: pay television with their digital 
channels ITV2, 3, 4 and HD; the launch of ITV Player on the PS3, Freesat and 
YouView.  
 
 
R&D costs  
Studies by Helfat and Raubitschek (2000); Steinbock (2000); and Macher and 
Mowery (2009) argues the creation of dynamic firm capabilities require a long term 
commitment to resource renewal that bear higher costs over a sustained period of 
time. However, one of the problems with using Annual Reports and Accounts is that 
these costs are not easily recognisable and are often obscured from obvious view. This 
has, therefore, made financial analysis of this variable difficult. Certainly the annual 
reports contain statements like; 
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“Opportunities for companies to acquire true market leadership are rare, and BskyB 
are uniquely placed to achieve this on the back of our investment in hardware, 
programmes and technologies.” 
Rupert Murdoch, Chairman. BskyB (2000:7) 
 
“Our digital channels are the most successful free to air commercial family of digital 
channels in the UK, each with distinctive branding and programming. We must 
ensure that they have the investment they need to grow their leading market position”. 
Michael Grade, Executive Chairman, ITV (2006:1) 
 
Significant Investment in people, and or, processes 
Zollo and Winter (2002) and Winter (2003) reported that this type of investment was 
a good platform on which to build a dynamic capability through the reconfiguration of 
firm resources. Once again, the Annual Reports did not make accessing this type of 
information accessible or consistent over time. There were some statements, however, 
that did indicate this type of activity; 
 
“We continue to invest consistently in the capital expenditure required to support our 
growth strategies...this included £341m invested in core services; information system 
infrastructure; broadcast infrastructure, broadband and telephony infrastructure, 
new product development...and customer service improvements. In addition, £114m 
was invested in new property and property improvements” 
BskyB Directors Report (2010:15) 
 
“We have invested more than 50% of our total revenues in programming, with the 
majority of this investment focused on ITV’s unique selling point, original UK 
production”. 
Michael Grade, Executive Chairman. ITV (2008:2) 
Acquisition of other companies for their capabilities  
The renewal and reconfiguration of firm capabilities and competencies may be 
achieved through two means, organic resource investment or the acquisition of 
another organisations capabilities (Colapinto, 2010; Macher and Mowery, 2009; 
Winter, 2003; Danneels, 2002; Steinbock, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat, 
2000; Karim and Mitchell, 2000).  
 
Over the time period of data collection, BskyB have made investments in numerous 
joint ventures. As part of their corporate strategy in the early 2000s they made 
significant resource investments and joint ventures agreements (£1,512m in 2000 and 
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£1,163m in 2001) in interactive services, customer relationship management and 
interactive broadcasting services. They recognised an opportunity for leadership in the 
pay-tv market noting that; 
“We are now moving decisively into new media through organic development and 
acquisitions, partnerships and joint ventures”. 
Rupert Murdoch, Chairman BSkyB, (2000:7) 
 
Between 2002-07 BskyB consolidated their earlier investment spending, with 
relatively small investments in the range of £22-£34m per annum. After 2007, this 
figure was not reported in their annual accounts.   
 
ITV made a number of small global content production based acquisitions up until 
2008, but the faltering advertising market and declining profits had reduced their 
ambitions. They focused on working in partnership with other  UK broadcasters, for 
example, launching Freesat with the BBC, which included a high definition ITV 
service; and partnering with the BBC and BT to deliver itv.com and online video 
services.  
 
Comparative Financial Analysis of Operating Ratios 
The qualitative content analysis has presented insight into how BskyB and ITV 
addressed the challenges of the new media environment and the renewal of their 
resources and capabilities. This leads us on to a central tenet of dynamic capability 
theory, that is, that these new capabilities deliver superior firm performance. This 
research measured superior performance in terms Operating Ratios in the form of; 
 
Return on Capital Employed as an overall measure of corporate performance as it 
reflects the assets used by the company to generate profit. 
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Asset Turnover as a measure of how many times a company’s total assets have been 
turned over in terms of sale. 
 
Net Profit Margin which measures the percentage profit of each £ of turnover after 
direct and indirect expenses have been deducted. 
  
Financial Ratio Analysis  
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) as an overall measure of corporate 
performance reflects the assets used by the company to generate profit.   
The ROCE for BskyB indicates an impressive and superior performance in leveraging 
their assets over a sustained period of time. The peak in 2005, is explained by a lack 
of any significant investment in corporate acquisitions and joint ventures, whilst at the 
same time, managing to achieve a decrease in a number of operating expenses in the 
form of programming costs, down £75m, as a result of re-negotiating sports contracts; 
and a reduction in movie costs down by £37m. Overall operating profit subsequently 
increased by 35% to £805m.  Since 2005 BSkyB have managed to sustain impressive 
ROCE figures.  
 
Perhaps the most striking figure in this analysis is the return posted by ITV in 2008. 
Here, a fall in their advertising revenues as a result of the global economic down turn 
had left them exposed in terms of their “high operational gearing, which means that 
any reduction in revenues has a significant impact on profits” (Michael Grade, 
Executive Chairman, ITV, 2008:2). The company also suffered an impairment charge 
of £2,638m as a result of their intangible assets being re-valued from £3,873m in 2007 
down to £1,140m the following year. This was mainly the result of a calculation of 
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goodwill being written down on their broadcasting, GMTV and Online businesses as 
a result of the economic downturn and outlook for growth in the TV advertising 
market. However, it is fair to say that ITV have improved their efficiency, mainly in 
programming spend, and this has delivered annual increases between 2009-11. 
 
Table 1: Return on Capital Employed 
TABLE 
 
 
Net Profit margin (NPM) which measures the percentage profit of each £ of 
turnover after direct and indirect expenses have been deducted. Inter-firm 
comparisons of this ratio revealed that BskyB has consistently out performed it’s 
rival. The downturn in total advertising market spend, as a result of the global 
economic recession, significantly affected ITV’s performance in 2008. Yet, ITV have 
managed costs and grown revenues since then and have returned increasingly 
respectable net profit margin figures in the following three years.     
 
Table 2: Net Profit Margin 
TABLE 
 
 
Asset Turnover (AT) is a measure of how efficiently a business uses their assets to 
generate sales revenue. A high AT figure indicates that the firm is generating a high 
level of sales from its resource base, although a note of caution should be made. High 
AT figures can also be an indicator of ‘overtrading’ and that sales are too big to be 
sustained from its existing resource base. Equally, a low AT figure is a good 
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indication that the company not reaching the level of sales that it should be from its 
resource base.  
 
Whilst BskyB returns have been consistent over the past decade, ITV has become 
more efficient in the use of their assets as a result of their three-year cost reduction 
programme (2005-2008). This resulted in costs savings of £41 million per annum 
during that period and was followed up in 2009 when they delivered around £40 
million in savings from regional services and £120 million in non-programming costs 
between 2009-10. ITV’s continued focus on revenue generation and cost reduction 
has certainly delivered a more efficient business in terms of assets generating sales 
revenue.  
Table 3: Asset Turnover 
 
TABLE 
 
 
Conclusions 
This research illustrates how two UK television broadcasters have managed their 
businesses in the same competitive media environment, but in very different ways, 
with different outcomes and performance effects. BskyB have adapted their business 
over the past decade, from being a television broadcaster to becoming a multi-
platform, multi-product media firm. This successful reconfiguring of their resources 
and adaption of capabilities has been driven by: seeking opportunities in a changing 
media landscape, setting ambitious corporate objectives, taking risks, investing in 
R&D and corporate acquisitions that renew, refresh and leverage new capabilities and 
competencies in a way that has delivered new products and services to consumers. 
Their corporate mantra of “invest and adapt” has resulted in a step change in their 
business that has delivered superior financial corporate performance in a relatively 
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short timescale. Quite simply, BskyB have satisfied all the criteria for an assessment 
of dynamic capability.  
 
ITV on the otherhand have not adapted to the new media environment at the same 
pace. Their 2010 Annual report is entitled “Transforming ITV” and appeared a 
decade after the advent of the new media environment, and this statement alone is a 
good indication of a company struggling to adapt. They have not reconfigured and 
renewed their resource base to the same extent as BskyB, although they have reduced 
their previously cumbersome and lethargic total asset base by 44% over the past 7 
years to become a far leaner business. Their corporate aspirations have lacked 
direction. They haven’t been innovative, nor delivered superior financial performance, 
and as such, their response to the new media environment can be considered as a 
‘dynamic incapability’. There is no doubt that ITV are trying to make up for lost 
ground following the merger of 2004, and their biggest strategic challenge is to 
convince themselves and their stakeholders that they are not managing a business in 
decline.  
 
Having read a sequence of annual reports and accounts for both companies, one 
cannot help but conclude that the fortunes of both companies have differed for a 
number of reasons. It would be an obvious conclusion to state that the differing 
business models have had a role to play. But it is striking to note that BskyB refer to 
their customers as their subscribers, whereas ITV refer to their customers mostly as 
their advertisers. In this sense, ITV may not be meeting the needs and wants of their 
audiences, which is a dangerous game to play. Another conclusion may be that ITV 
are battling the path dependency of a mature business operating in a mature industry, 
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with the same business model and a focused content-led strategy. As such, they have 
not responded to a new media landscape characterised by: digital and pay TV, 
audience fragmentation, video on demand, mobile content, and advertising revenues 
slowly migrating toward online audiences. 
 
This research has explored how UK television broadcasters have adapted to the 
challenges of the new media environment through the lens of dynamic capability. It 
has also sought to find a reliable measure of superior firm performance that indicates 
dynamic capability. As academics we often look for complicated solutions and 
intricate designs in our research methodology, when sometimes a simple solution 
would suffice. This paper concludes by arguing that Financial Operating Ratios can 
be considered as a reliable measure of superior firm performance that is indicative of 
dynamic capability. However, a criticism of using these ratios are that they tend to 
favour research into large corporations who are able, and have, to present financial 
data to various stakeholders and compliance bodies. An area of further research would 
be for researchers to identity dynamic capability in micro and small companies where 
financial operating ratio analysis would not be possible, simply because they do not 
have the resource or expertise to collect this type of data.   
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Table 1: Return on Capital Employed – PAGE 25 
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ROCE 
(%) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  2011 
BskyB -0.63 2.39  2.50 12.54 20.35 30.26 23.24 20.79 17.74 17.79 22.81 20.04 
ITV n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.18 5.46 4.32 3.36 -81.42 6.42 11.70 13.83 
 
 
Table 2: Net Profit Margin – PAGE 25 
 
NPM 
(%) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
BskyB -1.07 4.02 1.98 7.97 13.16 17.34 21.14 17.91 14.62 15.17 18.54 16.26 
ITV n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.62 14.98 12.10  9.22 -130.46 10.43 17.64 18.87 
 
 
Table 3: Asset Turnover – PAGE  
 
 
Asset 
Turnover 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
BskyB 0.59 0.59 1.26 1.57 1.55 1.74 1.10 1.16 1.21 1.17 1.23 1.23 
ITV n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.62 0.62 0.66 0.73 
 
 
 
